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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 16441 
RONALD RAY HERZOG, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted of the crime of rape in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After appellant's conviction he was sentenced to a term 
of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison and was 
placed on probation of cond;tion that he serve six months in 
the Salt Lake County Jail. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment rendered by 
the court and an entry of a judgment of acquittal, or in the 
alternative a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 1, 1978, the prosecutrix was at the Westerner 
Lounge in Salt Lake County. After a fight with her husband, 
she left (t.35). She walked East on 35th South where she 
observed Appellant in his parked truck. Appellant asked 
her if she wanted a ride which she accepted (t.37,105). 
After getting in Appellant's truck, prosecutrix suggested 
that they get some beer (t.38, 106), whereupon Appellant 
stopped at a 7-11 and prosecutrix entered and purchased a 
six-pack of beer (t.39). After purchasing the beer, Appellant 
suggested they smoke a joint. Prosecutrix agreed, but didn't 
want to go to her home to smoke it because she had been fighting 
with her husband (t.39). Appellant suggested going for a 
ride and prosecutrix agreed (t.40). They drove up Parley's 
Canyon, took one of the exits where they parked (t.41, 42, 43). 
After smoking the joint, Appellant asked prosecutrix if she 
wanted to ball (t.44). She responded "No" whereupon Appellant 
reached for her purse. Prosecutrix indicated he could have 
it and reached for the door, whereupon Appellant grabbed her 
shirt and bra and ?Ulled her towards him, telling her not to 
make him violent---for her not to make him force her and he 
wouldn't hurt her---to do what he wanted and he wouldn't hurt 
her; whereupon, prcsecu~!'°ix said "Okay, I' 12. do wh~_t you 
want (t.45, 111). 
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None of the clothing prosecutrix was wearing was torn or 
ripped (t.66, 67). Prosecutrix then tried to talk Appellant 
out of it and then agreed to do what Appellant wanted (t.46). 
She then exited the vehicle, removed a tarnpax, her under-
pants, her levis and got back in the truck and laid down on 
the seat (t. 47, 68, 69, 116). 
Appellant was unable to get an erection, so prosecutrix 
played with him until he ,got an erection; whereupon, inter-
course occurred (t.48, 69, 70, 71, 117, 118). Appellant then 
drove prosecutrix home where she remained without reporting 
the incident to anyone until her husband returned at sometime 
between 12:00 and 2:00 P.M. that day (t.52, 73). Prosecutrix 
admitted she made no attempt to flee nor did she cry for help 
(t.60). She suffered no injuries including scratches or 
bruises (t. 75). No weapons were ever used (t.66). 
Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with 
rape. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
VERDICT BECAUSE THERE WAS REASONABLE DOUBT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE CONSENT OF THE PROSE-
CUTRIX WAS LACKING. 
The standard for review of criminal convictions on the 
basis of insufficiency of the evidence is that "it must appear 
that upon so viewing the evidence reasonable minds must 
necessarily entertain reasonable doubt that the defendant 
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committed the crime". State v. Wilson, 565 P. 2d 66 (1977). 
The standard for determining if there was sufficient 
evidence to find consent as shown by the resistance to the 
sexual assalt, was established by the Utah Supreme Court 
in State v. Horne, 12 Ut. 2d 16 364 P. 2d 109 (1961): 
"The law does not require that the woman shall 
do more than her age, strength, the surrounding 
facts, and all attending circumstances make it 
reasonable for her to do in order to manifest 
her opposition. However, in determining the 
sufficiency of the evidence, there must be 
considered the ease of assertion of the forcible 
accomplishment of the sexual act, with impos-
sibility of defense except by direct denial, or 
of the proneness of the woman, when she finds 
the fact of her disgrace discovered or likely 
of discovery to minimize her fault by asserting 
force or violence, which had led courts to hold 
to a very strict rule of proof in such cases." 
364 P. 2d at 112. 
Furthermore, "it is, of course, incumbant upon the state 
to prove resistance which was overcome by force as one of the 
elements of the crime" State v. Ward, 10 Ut. 2d 34, 347 P.2d 
865 ( 1959) . 
Appellant in this case was convicted of rape pursuant to 76-: 
Utah Code Ann. (as amended 1973) which defines rape as follows: 
A male person commits rape when he has sexual inter-
course with a female, not his wife, without her consent. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-5-406 (as amended 1973) describes seven circum-
stances under which sexual intercourse, sodomy or sexual 
abuse occur without consent. T~e subsections which are 
applicable to this case are "(1) when the actor compels the 
victim to submit or participate by force that overcomes 
such earnest resistance as might reasonably be expected under 
the circumstances; or (2) the actor compels the victim to 
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submit or participate by any threat that would prevent 
resistance by a person of ordinary resolution." 
At most there was a verbal threat involved in this 
case. A number of Utah cases since Horne, supra, have dealt 
with the question as to whether there was sufficient evidence 
to find consent as shown by the resistance of the prosecutrix 
to the sexual assault. In State v. Horne, supra, the Supreme 
court reversed the conviction finding that the actions of 
the prosecutrix did not establish that her consent was ob-
tained by force or fear; in other words, the Supreme Court, 
in reviewing the evidence found that the prosecutrix's claim 
that her consent had been obtained by force or fear was 
not substantiated by the evidence. In that case, there was 
some evidence of verbal threats but nothing more. The 
prosecutrix made no effort to escape when the opportunity 
presented itself. In this regard, the Supreme Court rejected 
as an excuse for not attempting an escape, potential danger 
to the children of the prosecutrix who remained in the presence 
of the alleged rapist. There was no evidence of attempt to 
cry for help. There was no evidence of any injury to the 
prosecutrix. There was some evidence of damage to clothing 
in that the panties of the prosecutrix were slightly torn. 
This case is closest in it's facts to the case before the 
court although here there is no evidence of damage to the 
clothing, only a verbal threat. 
In 1974, the utah Supreme Court affirmed a rape conviction 
in State v. Nunez, 520 P.2d 881 (Ut. 1974). In that case, 
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two men were found guilty of rape. In affirming the con-
viction against a claim of insufficient evidence the court 
found: (1) that there were two men present who detained 
the proxecutrix, (2) that they verbally threatened her, (3) 
that they threatened her with a knife, and (4) that they 
physically restrained her with the use of force to have 
intercourse with them despite her begging and pleading. In 
this case, more than mere verbal threat were present, thus 
distinguishing it by its facts from State v. Horne, supra 
and the case herein. 
In 1977, this court dealt twice with the issue of the 
sufficiency of the evidence in a claimed consent rape case. 
In State v. Anselmo 558 P.2d 1325 (Ut. 1977) the defendant's 
conviction was affirmed. The court noted in it's opinion 
that the prosecutrix had: (1) been verbally threatened, (2) 
had her clothing torn from her, (3) been struck in the face 
so as to severly blacken both eyes, (4) had been followed to 
the bathroom and hit with fists, (5) had hands placed on 
her throat, (6) fists had been drawn back as a symbol of 
striking, and (7) had been forcibly placed on the bed where 
she had been raped. More than mere verbal threat were made 
thus distinguishing this case by its facts from State v. 
Horne, supra and the case herein. 
The other 1977 case was State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700 
(Ut. 1977). The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction against 
the claim of insufficiency of the evidence on the issue of 
consent. In doing so, the court noted that the consent, if 
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any, had been obtained through force and fear. The court 
found that the prosecutrix had been: (1) verbally threatened, 
(2) physically pinned to the floor during a struggle, (3) 
physically assaulted in that a hand had been put over her 
mouth so that she had difficulty breathing and (4) forced 
intercourse against her will had occurred. Again, this case 
is distinguished by it's facts from State v. Horne, supra 
and the case herein. 
It is clear from the record that in the instant case, the 
most we have is a verbal threat together with a grabbing of 
clothing (not sufficient to cause any damage) • There is no 
evidence of physical force. There is no evidence of physical 
injury. There is no evidence of torn clothing. There is 
no evidence of a struggle. There is no evidence of a weapon. 
There is no evidence of an attempt to cry out or obtain 
attention. There is no evidence of an attempt to flee. There is 
only evidence that after a verbal threat and a grabbing of 
certain items of clothing that the prosecutrix left the 
vehicle by herself, removed her levis by herself, removed 
her panties by herself, removed her tampax by herself and then 
re-entered the vehicle where she laid down and prepared her-
self for intercourse and when appellant was unable to obtain 
an erection, she assisted; in fact, but for this assistance, 
penetration could never have been made and we would not be 
in court today. 
This case is as close on a factual basis to State v. 
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Horne, supra, as any reported Utah case. Looking at all of 
the facts and circumstances, it is apparent that reasonable 
minds would necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt that 
the prosecutrix had in fact, consented to the sexual inter-
course and the verdict should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case is insufficient for the 
appellant to be convicted of rape. The prosecutrix did not 
resist in a way reasonably expected under the circumstances. 
At no time did she resist physically, nor did she attempt to 
flee. At no time during the intercourse did she indicate 
that she did not desire to participate in the act. She 
suffered no cuts, bruises, abrasions or damage to her clothing 
as a result of this incident. Consequently, there is a 
reasonable doubt that the appellant engaged in the act of 
sexual intercourse by force or fear. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
Lawyer for Appellant 
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